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BRIEF 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CITY OF SALT LAKE, ] 
Plaintiff and ; 
Appellee, ] 
vs. 
RICHARD COPIER, 
Defendant and ] 
Appellant. ] 
1 APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
I Appeal No. 920777-CA 
t (Argument Priority 2) 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
JUDGE FUCHS 
ROBERT H. COPIER - #727 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-0099 
MARSHA S. ATKIN - #5246 
Assistant Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
451 South 200 East, #125 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 535-7767 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under U.C.A. §78-
2a-3(2)(d) and (f). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Issue for review and standard of review: The issue on 
appeal is whether alcohol content of "0.08%" or greater by 
weight" constitutes a public offense now that the state 
enabling statute has been amended to remove the percentage 
weight standard and establish an actual measurement standard. 
The Appellate Court reviews such questions of law for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. Reeves 
v. Gentile. 813 P.2d 111 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
RULES 
U.R.E. 201(g) 
U.R.Cr.P. 23 
3 
STATUTES 
U.C.A. Sec. 41-6-43(1) 
U.C.A. Sec. 41-6-44(1)(a) and (2) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was convicted of driving with a "blood or 
breath alcohol content" of "0.08% or greater by weight". The 
Court denied Defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment in open 
court on September 23, 1992, and entered Judgment September 30, 
1992. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The legislature has provided that local DUI ordinances 
must be consistent with state code DUI provisions. 
The legislature has amended state code DUI provisions 
to remove the "0.08% by weight" standard and replace it with 
an actual "0.08 gram" standard stated as an actual quantity 
instead of a percentage. 
Salt Lake City used the old outdated percentage 
standard in this case, and that allegation does not constitute 
4 
a public offense now that the state has adopted an actual 
quantity standard instead of a percentage standard. 
This appeal stands for the proposition that by taking 
the trouble to amend state law governing DUI, the state 
senate, the state house of representatives, and the governor 
intended to change the law governing DUI, and that Salt Lake 
City is required to follow the statefs lead by pleading 
and proving offenses consistent with said change. The 
failure to do so cannot be cured by a post-trial effort to 
have the court take judicial notice that the old and new 
standards supposedly mean the same thing and that supposedly 
no change was wrought by the amendment to state law. 
Salt Lake City's duty to conform to express statutory 
enabling law existed under State v. Hutchinson, infra, and 
is now even more pronounced now that the Utah Supreme Court 
appears to have re-adopted the Dillon rule to a certain 
extent in Weese v. Davis County Commission, infra. 
ARGUMENT 
U.R.Cr.P. 23 provides that at any time prior to the 
imposition of sentence, the Court, upon motion of a Defendant, 
5 
shall arrest judgment if the facts proved do not constitute a 
public offense. Appellant so moved when sentence in this 
matter had not yet been imposed and the facts proved at trial 
did not constitute a public offense. 
Salt Lake City alleged in the information that 
"Defendant unlawfully operated or was in actual physical 
control of a vehicle while Defendant's blood or breath alcohol 
content was 0.08% or greater by weight" and made use of a 
chemical test at trial to prove this allegation. 
This allegation did not constitute a public offense. 
Under U.C.A. §41-6-43(1)(1992), ordinances adopted by local 
authorities are limited as follows: 
(1) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that 
governs a person's operating or being in actual 
physical control of a motor vehicle while having 
alcohol in the blood or while under the influence 
of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence 
of alcohol and any drug, or that governs, in 
relation to any of those matters, the use of a 
chemical test or chemical tests, or evidentiary 
presumptions, or penalties, or that governs any 
combination of those matters, shall be consistent 
with the provisions of this code which govern 
those matters. 
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The relevant provision of the Utah Code which governs 
this matter appears at U.C.A. §41-6-44(1)(a) and (2) and reads 
as follows: 
(1)(a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in 
this section for any person to operate or be in 
actual physical control of a vehicle within this 
state if the person has a blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater as shown by 
a chemical test given within two hours after the 
alleged operation of physical control or if the 
person is under the influence of alcohol or any 
drug or the combined influence of alcohol or any 
drug to a degree which renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle . . . . 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters 
of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath 
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 
liters of breath. 
The standards of .08 grams of alcohol per 100 
milliliters of blood or .08 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of 
breath are standards that materially differ from and are not 
consistent with the blood or breath alcohol content of 0.08% 
or greater by weight stated in the information and proved at 
trial. The information proved at trial does not constitute a 
public offense. Accordingly, any attempt by Salt Lake City to 
create a public offense as alleged in the information and 
proved at trial is ultra vires and void ab initio under U.C.A. 
§41-6-43(1) (1992). Even under the liberalized standard of 
review in State v. Hutchinson. 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980) in 
which the Utah Supreme Court rejected the old Dillon rule that 
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had been previously applied by Utah Supreme Court, Salt Lake 
City has no power to create, plead, or prove a public offense 
that is directly contrary to the affirmative mandate of U.C.A. 
41-6-44(1)(a) and (2)(1992), based on Judge Garff's analysis 
in Richfield City v. . Walker, 790 P.2d 87 (Utah App. 1990), 
where the state statute had not been amended to use an actual 
0.08 grams standard and still used a 0.08% standard. See also 
Weese v. Davis County Commission, 834 P.2d 1 (Utah 1992), where 
the Utah Supreme Court seems to re-adopt the Dillon test. 
Jeopardy having attached, and the Motion to Arrest 
Judgment timely filed prior to the imposition of sentence, the 
Court should have permanently arrested the Judgment and entered 
its order of dismissal with prejudice. 
Salt Lake City's request that the trial court take 
judicial notice after the jury trial had been concluded 
violated Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to have the facts 
of the case decided by the jury. 
Under U.R.E. 201(g), facts judicially noticed are not 
binding upon the jury in a criminal case, and therefore, Salt 
Lake City's post-trial request for judicial notice was 
improper. 
8 
Salt Lake City has yet to explain why it failed and 
refused to bring its municipal DUI ordinance into conformity 
and plead a DUI allegation in this case that followed the 
enabling language in state law. 
CONCLUSION 
The allegation charged in the information and proved 
at trial does not constitute a public offense, and judgment 
should be reversed in this case. 
DATED this day of 
9 
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foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief were hand-carried, to Salt 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Information filed by Salt Lake City in the trial court. 
2. Determinative law. 
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
A Municipal Corporation 
vs. 
RICHARD COPIER 
08/19/51 
DEFENDANT 
ATE OF UTAH 
ty and County of Salt Lake 
INFORMATION 
Court Case 925015939TC 
Judge FMP 
ss. 
S. ATKIN of Salt Lake City,in the County of Salt Lake, 
ate of Utah on behalf of said City, on oath complains that the above 
med defendant whose other and true name is to complainant unknown, 
Salt Lake City, in the County of Salt Lake and State of Utah on or about 
/30/92 2324 ,at Salt Lake City, in the County of Salt Lake and state 
Dresaid did commit the public offense of 
DLATING THE SALT LAKE CITY CODE, as follows, to-wit: 
NT I: 
FENDANT UNLAWFULLY OPERATED OR WAS IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A VEHICLE 
ILE DEFENDANT'S BLOOD OR BREATH ALCOHOL CONTENT WAS 0.08% OR GREATER BY 
IGHT, OR WHILE DEFENDANT WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL OR ANY DRUG OR 
E COMBINED INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND ANY DRUG TO A DEGREE WHICH RENDERED 
FENDANT INCAPABLE OF SAFELY OPERATING A VEHICLE. A CLASS B 
3DEMEAN0R. 
VIOLATION OF SALT LAKE CITY CODE, SECTION 12-24-100 
¥T II: 
Eendant failed to stop at the red light semaphore. 
VIOLATION OF SALT LAKE CITY CODE, SECTION 12-32-030 
counts located at approximately 500 S 200 W 
:e 
Complainant 
Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
583 UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 402 
ground of objection, if the specific gTound was not 
apparent from the context; or 
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one 
excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence 
was made known to the court by offer or was 
apparent from the context within which ques-
tions were asked, 
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may 
add any other or further statement which shows the 
character of the evidence, the form in which it was 
offered, the objection made, and the ruling thereon. It 
may direct the making of an offer in question and 
answer form. 
tc) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings 
shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to 
prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested 
to the jury by any mean6, such as making statements 
or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of 
the jury. 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes 
taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial 
rights although they were not brought to the atten-
tion of the court. 
Rule 104. Preliminary questions. 
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Pre-
liminary questions concerning the qualification of a 
person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or 
the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by 
the court, subject to the provisions of Subdivision (b). 
In making its determination it is not bound by the 
rules of evidence except those with respect to privi-
leges. 
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the 
relevancy of evidence depends upon the fulfillment of 
a condition of fact, the court 6hall admit it upon, or 
subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to 
support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition. 
(CJ Hearing of jury. Hearings on the admissibility 
of confessions shall in all cases be conducted out of 
the hearing of the jury. Hearings on other prelimi-
nary matters shall be so conducted when the interests 
of justice require or, when an accused is a witness, if 
he so requests. 
(d) Testimony by accused. The accused does not, 
by testifying upon a preliminary matter, subject him-
self to cross-examination as to other issues in the 
case. 
(e) Weight and credibility. This rule does not 
limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury 
evidence relevant to weight or credibility. 
Rule 105. Limited admissibility. 
When evidence which is admissible as to one party 
or for one purpose but not admissible as to another 
party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, 
upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper 
scope and instruct the jury accordingly. 
Rule 106. Remainder of or related writings or 
recorded statements. 
When a writing or recorded statement or part 
thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party 
may require him at that time to introduce any other 
part or any other writing or recorded statement 
which ought in fairness to be considered contempora-
neously with it. 
ARTICLE II. JUDICIAL NOTICE. 
Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial 
notice of adjudicative facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must 
be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is 
either (1) generally known within the territorial ju-
risdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate 
and ready determination by resort to sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judi-
cial notice, whether requested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial 
notice if requested by a party and supplied with the 
necessary information. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled 
upon timely request to an opportunity to be heard as 
to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the tenor 
of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notifica-
tion, the request may be made after judicial notice 
has been taken. 
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be 
taken at any stage of the proceeding. 
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceed-
ing, the court shall instruct the jury to accept as con-
clusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal case, 
the court shall instruct the jury that it may. but is not 
required to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially 
noticed. 
ARTICLE III. PRESUMPTIONS. 
Rule 301. Presumptions in general in civil ac-
tions and proceedings. 
(a) Effect. In all civil actions and proceedings not 
otherwise provided for by statute or by these rules, a 
presumption imposes on the party against whom it is 
directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence 
of the presumed fact is more probable than its exis-
tence. 
(b) Inconsistent presumptions. If presumptions 
are inconsistent, the presumption applies that is 
founded upon weightier considerations of policy. If 
considerations of policy are of equal weight neither 
presumption applies. 
Rule 302. Applicability of federal law in civil ac-
tions and proceedings. 
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a pre-
sumption respecting a fact which is an element of a 
claim or defense as to which federal law supplies the 
rule of decision is determined in accordance with fed-
eral law. 
ARTICLE IV. RELEVANCY AND ITS 
LIMITS. 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissi-
ble; irrelevant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as oth-
erwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, stat-
ute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in 
courts of this state. Evidence which is not relevant is 
not admissible. 
ule 22 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 542 
(8^ If the defendant is placed on parole, treatment 
all, upon the recommendation of the Psychiatric 
curity Review Board, be made a condition of parole, 
lilure to continue treatment or other condition of 
role except by agreement with the designated men-
1 health services provider and the Board of Pardons 
a basis for initiating parole violation hearings. The 
riod of parole may not be for fewer than five years 
until the expiration of the defendant's sentence, 
lichever comes first, and may not be reduced with-
t consideration by the Board of Pardons of a cur-
nt report on the mental health status of the of-
nder. 
(9) (a) A defendant who pleads or is found guilty 
and mentally ill who is placed on probation by 
the sentencing court, shall be placed under the 
jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board. The Psychiatric Security Review Board 
shall make treatment a condition of probation if 
the defendant is shown to be treatable and facili-
ties exist for treatment of the offender in a proba-
tion status. Reports as specified by the trial judge 
shall be filed with the probation officer and the 
sentencing court. 
(b) Failure to continue treatment or other con-
dition of probation, except by agreement with the 
treating agency and the Psychiatric Security Re-
view Board, is a basis for the initiation of proba-
tion violation hearings. The period of probation 
may not be for fewer than five years or until the 
expiration of the defendant's sentence, whichever 
comes first, and may not be reduced by the sen-
tencing court without consideration of a current 
report on the mental health status of the of-
fender. 
(c^  Treatment or other care may be provided 
by or under contract with the Division of Mental 
Health, a local mental health authority, or, with 
the approval of the Psychiatric Security Review 
Board, any other mental health provider. A re-
port shall be filed with the probation officer and 
the sentencing court every three months during 
the period of probation. If a motion on a petition 
to discontinue probation is made by the defen-
dant, the probation officer shall request a report. 
A motion on a petition to discontinue probation 
may not be heard more than once every six 
months. 
10) (a) With regard to persons committed by the 
court to the Utah State Hospital or other facility 
under this section prior to July 1, 1989, the effec-
tive date of this act, the superintendent of the 
Utah State Hospital, or his designee, shall peti-
tion the court within 60 days after that date for 
review of those orders. The court shall review 
and modify those orders to include commitment 
to the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security Re-
view Board established under Section 77-38-2. 
(b) With regard to persons who have been 
placed on probation by the sentencing court un-
der Subsection (9) prior to July 1, 1989, the effec-
tive date of this act, the executive director of the 
Department of Corrections, or his designee, shall 
petition the court within 60 days after that date 
for review of those orders. The court shall review 
and modify those orders to include placement un-
der the jurisdiction of the Psychiatric Security 
Review Board established under Section 77-38-2. 
le 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment 
i) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or 
i of no contest, the court shall set a time for impos-
ing sentence which shall be not less than two nor 
more than 30 days after the verdict or plea, unless 
the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, oth-
erwise orders. Pending sentence, the court may com-
mit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or 
recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the 
defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his 
own behalf and to present any information in mitiga-
tion of punishment, or to show any legal cause why 
sentence should not be imposed. The prosecuting at-
torney shall also be given an opportunity to present 
any information material to the imposition of sen-
tence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be 
tried in his absence, he may likewise be sentenced in 
his absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sen-
tence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by the 
court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no 
contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall en-
ter a judgment of conviction which shall include the 
plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Follow-
ing imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the 
defendant of his right to appeal and the time within 
which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the 
court shall issue its commitment setting forth the 
sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the 
jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commit-
ment to the jail or prison and shall make his return 
on the commitment and file it with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time. 
Rule 23. Arrest of judgment. 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the 
court upon its own initiative may, or upon motion of a 
defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or 
admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the 
defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause 
for the arrest of judgment. Upon arresting judgment 
the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the 
offense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, 
order a commitment until the defendant is charged 
anew or retried, or may enter any other order as may 
be just and proper under the circumstances. 
Rule 24. Motion for new trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon 
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of 
justice if there is any error or impropriety which had 
a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a 
party. 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writ-
ing and upon notice. The motion shall be accompa-
nied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion. If additional time is required to 
procure affidavits or evidence the court may postpone 
the hearing on the motion for such time as it deems 
reasonable. 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 
10 days after imposition of sentence, or within such 
further time as the court may fix during the ten-day 
period. 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in 
the same position as if no trial had been held and the 
former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either 
in evidence or in argument. 
Rule 25. Dismissal without trial. 
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in 
furtherance of justice, the court may, either on its 
753 MOTOR VEHICLES 41HH44 
(2) If a damaged vehicle 6ticker describing the 
damage is affixed to the vehicle, a report under this 
section is not required. 1987 
41-6-40. Acc ident reports — When confidential 
— Insurance policy information — Use 
as evidence — Penalty for false infor-
mation. 
(1) All written reports required in this article to be 
forwarded to the department by operators or owners 
of vehicles involved in accidents or by garages are 
without prejudice to the reporting individual and are 
for the confidential use of the department or other 
state agencies having use for the records for accident 
prevention purposes. However, the department may 
disclose the identity of a person involved in an acci-
dent when the identity is not otherwise known or 
when the person denies his presence at the accident. 
The department shall disclose whether any person or 
vehicle involved in an accident reported under this 
section was covered by a vehicle insurance policy, and 
the name of the insurer. 
(2) Written reports forwarded under this section 
may not be used as evidence in any trial, civil or 
criminal, arising out of an accident, except that the 
department shall furnish upon demand of any party 
to the trial or upon demand of any court a certificate 
showing that a specified accident report has or has 
not been made to the department in compliance with 
law, and if the report has been made, the date, time, 
and location of the accident, the names and addresses 
of the drivers, the owners of the vehicles involved, 
and the investigating officers. The reports may be 
used as evidence when necessary to prosecute charges 
filed in connection with a violation of Subsection (3). 
(3) A person who gives information in oral or writ-
ten reports as required in this chapter knowing or 
having reason to believe that the information is false 
is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. i&87 
41-6-41. Statistical information regarding acci-
dents — Annual publication. 
The department shall tabulate and may analyze all 
accident reports and shall publish annually, or at 
more frequent intervals, related statistical informa-
tion as to the number and circumstances of traffic 
accidents. 1987 
41-6-42. Local p o w e r s to require r e p o r t 
A local authority may by ordinance require that 
the operator of a vehicle involved in any accident, or 
the owner of the vehicle, also file with the designated 
municipal department a written report of the acci-
dent or a copy of any report required under this arti-
cle to be filed with the department on accidents occur-
ring within its jurisdiction. All reports are for the 
confidential use of the municipal department and are 
subject to Section 41-6-40. i$87 
ARTICLE 5 
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED A N D 
RECKLESS DRIVING 
41-6-43. Local DUI and related ordinances and 
reckless driving ordinances — Consis-
tent with code. 
(1) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that 
governs a person's operating or being in actual physi-
cal control of a motor vehicle while having alcohol in 
the blood or while under the influence of alcohol or 
any drug or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug, or that governs, in relation to any of those 
matters, the use of a chemical test or chemical tests, 
or evidentiary presumptions, or penalties, or that 
governs any combination of those matters, shall be 
consistent with the provisions in this code which gov-
ern those matters. 
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that 
governs reckless driving, or operating a vehicle in 
willful or wanton disregard for the 6afety of persons 
or property shall be consistent with the provisions of 
this code which govern those matters. iss" 
41-6-43.10. Repealed. 1985 
41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol 
or drug or with specified or unsafe 
blood alcohol concentration — Mea-
surement of blood or breath alcohol — 
Criminal punishment — Arrest with-
out warrant — Penalties — Suspension 
or revocation of license. 
(1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as provided in 
this section for any person to operate or be in 
actual physical control of a vehicle within this 
state if the person has a blood or breath alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater as shown 
by a chemical test given within two hours after 
the alleged operation or physical control, or if the 
person is under the influence of alcohol or any 
drug or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug to a degree which renders the person 
incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violat-
ing this section is or has been legally entitled to 
use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any 
charge of violating this section. 
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be 
based upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of 
blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall 
be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of 
breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first time of a viola-
tion of Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misde-
meanor. But if the person has also inflicted bod-
ily injury upon another as a proximate result of 
having operated the vehicle in a negligent man-
ner, he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence 
is that of simple negligence, the failure to exer-
cise that degree of care which an ordinarily rea-
sonable and prudent person exercises under like 
or similar circumstances. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court 
shall, upon a first conviction, impose a manda-
tory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive 
hours nor more than 240 hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, 
require the person to work in a community-ser-
vice work program for not less than 24 hours nor 
more than 50 hours. 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or commu-
nity-service work program, the court shall order 
the person to participate in an assessment and 
educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabili-
tation facility. 
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violation 
committed within six years of a prior violation 
under this section or under a local ordinance sim-
ilar to this section adopted in compliance with 
Section 41-6-43 the court shall as part of any sen-
tence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not 
less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than 
720 hours. 
